6. Planning spatial changes

In this chapter I plan to draw conclusions from the arguments made in the previous chapters. In the first paragraph I will summarize and discuss the answers on the research questions from chapter one. In the last paragraph I will make a final statement on the basic direction of a new theory on spatial change and planning.

6.1 Conclusions and discussion

What is the message Habermas wants to deliver in his theory of communicative action?

In chapter two I started to talk about the opposition of philosophical modernism and postmodernism. After Kant and Marx, modernism became the leading theory in philosophy and science. Important elements of modernism are the distinction of nature and culture, and the belief in technological feasibility and progress. However in the late 1970s modernism found itself in a crisis. From this crisis postmodernism emerged. However, philosophers like Jürgen Habermas were not about giving up modernity. Habermas invented a theory of communicative action to save the project of modernity. The theory of communicative action is a normative attempt to introduce rules for communication among actors that want to come to an agreement.

Which alternatives for Habermas' theory of communicative action have been suggested by his critics?

Foucault is one of the philosophers who has criticised the work of Habermas. Whereas Habermas is the more modernistic thinker, Foucault has opposite ideas. According to Foucault it are power systems that determine how actors behave in relation to each other. Power system can change through resistance. However, a world that is not determined by power relations is impossible, according to Foucault. He also shows that it is not difficult to replace the fundamentals on which modernism is based by other fundamentals. Replacing common knowledge has been done over and over through history.

In chapter two we also met Richard Rorty and Bruno Latour as philosophers who are somewhere in the middle. Rorty can be described as a thinker who believes Foucault is right on the issue of legitimacy of common knowledge. However, he shares Habermas political engagement. As Rorty believes, we do not need to legitimate the liberal position of Habermas by philosophical means. Its legitimation can be found in literature. Bruno Latour has tried to not only put the best of modernism and postmodernism together, but also take pre-modernism into account. Latour wants to break down the separations between humans and non-humans. His aim is to show that facts are constructed in the same way as opinions are. His alternative to both modernism and postmodern solutions, is to develop a new Constitution which scenarizate the world based on experimental metaphysics.

How has the theory of communicative action been interpreted, changed and used by planning theorists?

When we want to use philosophical fundamentals to develop an alternative to contemporary planning theory, we have to examine first which philosophical fundamentals set the basic assumptions of planning theory. Obviously, the leading theory on planning now is communicative and collaborative planning. For the biggest part this theory is influenced by Habermas' theory of communicative action. As we saw in chapter three, Forester and Healey use Habermas' criteria to develop and use heuristic questions for planning which should lead to power-challenging planning. Communicative planning theorists like Healey and Forester claim to take also planning practice and the philosophy of Michel Foucault into account. In chapter three, I have argued the influence of Foucault is of little importance in their work.

How can alternative philosophical fundamentals be used in order to get an alternative theory on spatial change?

In chapter two I have introduced the notion of synthesis as an instrument to canalize the search for an alternative theory on spatial change. When we face opposite theories (thesis and anti-thesis), we can make progress by searching a synthesis. In the case of philosophy we can see modernism as a thesis. Postmodernism is of course the anti-thesis. Latour has even added a second anti-thesis: the one of pre-modernism.

When we look at spatial planning and spatial change, the above-mentioned communicative planning theory is the thesis we are approaching. Planning alternatives based on postmodernistic philosophy are emphasized by Bent Flyvbjerg. Based on the philosophy of, among others, Michel Foucault and the Aalborg case study he concludes that power systems are of big influence in planning projects. From the argument in paragraph 3.4.2 we can further derive the conclusion that there is already a search for synthesis of modernity and postmodernity. However, whereas De Roo takes another definition of postmodernity as I would like to emphasise, Reuter does not take pre-modernism into account. As Latour (1993) shows us, we do not only have to take modernism and postmodernism into account. In addition of this we also have to look at pre-modernism.

As I have sketched in chapter four, Latour wants to get rid of al metaphysical prejudice of the old Constitution. Then the proposal is made to include propositions in the democratic procedure. Propositions are associations of humans and non-humans. As Latour argues humans and non-humans are never on their one. They are always accompanying each other. For example, every invention comes with its inventor. Proposition do not have an essence from their birth. Once propositions have been discovered they go through a process of consultation of their spokespersons and hierarchizing. The stage of hierarchizing is needed to discuss what the proposition is. Its essence is not a given, but it has to be constructed. When it turns out that we can live together with the new proposition, it can be instituted. Otherwise it has to be rejected.

During the process there are four disciplines that make a contribution to the process. Scientists, politicians, economists and moralists have their part. This is one of the weak links in Latour's theory. Why not make a group of citizens? Why only economists and not social sciences as a whole? Latour takes the division of labour among these groups as common sense. However, one could argue that, even in a world without metaphysics, good sense cannot be the one and only argument for dividing the labour into four divisions. However, it has to be mentioned here that Latour is not creating a new metaphysics. Also the requirements of the new Constitution itself are just a preliminary scenarization. Furthermore, the four disciplines are used with a broad conception of the definition. Using this conception everyone who is using models to make a contribution to the process from proposition to actor can be seen as an economist. And the leaders of the labour unions can be seen as politicians in the way they make their contribution to the requirements of the new Constitution. So for now we cannot do anything else than take the categories of Latour as good sense. However, when someone comes up with a new idea (proposition), it has to be examined.

A second remark is the separation of the powers. Latour takes this separation as being important because it helps us to take into account as much propositions as possible. When the powers are separated, the steps of perplexity, consultation, hierarchization and institution do follow each other up in time. However, from the Stuttgart 21 case we can derive the conclusion that the separation does not last when the theory is put in practice. This would mean that the new Constitution cannot guarantee that as much propositions as possible are taken into account.

In the last place there can be made a remark on the position of the administrators (the planning theorists). According to Latour the administrators should have no influence on the process they describe. However, that would mean that authors like Healey and Forester do not have an influence on what is happening in planning practice. In fact the opposite is happening (as we can derive from De Roo & Schwartz 2001:25-27).

Can this alternative theory on spatial change explain practice?

After examining two examples from spatial practice, it is not possible to give a final answer to the question whether the new Constitution can explain practice or not. However, there can be thoughtfully concluded that there is a big chance that it can contribute something. The examples of Aramis and Stuttgart 21 are pointing in that direction. Except for the above-mentioned remarks it seems to be able to reconstruct the story about Stuttgart 21 in such a way that it fits into the theory of the new Constitution. In the case of the story about Aramis, telling the story in such a way that it fits into the new Constitution did lead to concrete answers to the question who killed Aramis.

6.2 Planning in the new Constitution

It has become obvious that what is called postmodern planning by theorists like Healey, Forester and De Roo should be seen as Habermasian modernism from a philosophical point of view. However, it has to be mentioned that the three named planning theorists do move in a more postmodern direction (see for example Forester 1989 or De Roo & Porter 2004).

I have tried to find out whether taking other philosophical fundamentals than Habarmas' theory of communicative action can help us to understand spatial change. When we follow Lyotard's view on the postmodern condition of society, planning would have no chance at all to survive. However, when planners take philosophy serious we cannot leave out Lyotard's view on postmodernity. Neither can we ignore the criticism on the project of modernity.

It is at this point Bruno Latour comes into play. He has offered us a way out of the dilemma, by proposing an experimental metaphysics. When we take Latour as the leading fundament, we do not face the problems Healey, Forester and De Roo do. To be more specific: we do not face the power-blindness of Habermas' critical theory. Neither do we have to give up planning as a whole, as Lyotard suggest we are doing in the crisis after modernism. Al we have to do is get to deal with the experimental metaphysics Latour is sketching. This will offer us a framework in which it is possible to explain the role and mutual influence of humans and non-humans in the planning process. We do not have to take this influence anymore as an autonomous phenomenon outside any theory. Furthermore the new Constitution creates the possibility to take both discourse and power into account. However, Latour stays on a highly abstract level here. When we want to say something on how the concepts of discourse and power interact in the new Constitution we need other authors than Latour. At this point contemporary planning theorists come into play. Healey, Forester and De Roo can tell us something about the discourse story, whereas Flyvbjerg and Richardson write about the influence of power. The tree elements of the new Constitution are listed in scheme 6.1.

(schema 6)

I have now tried to make clear what the new Constitution could add to contemporary planning theory. As we can derive from scheme 6.1 this can be found in the way the new Constitution makes it possible to say a word on the mutual influence between humans and non-humans. Furthermore it provides a framework in which both power and discourse can be used to explain spatial changes. On the other hand: based on two examined case studies there can be made some remarks. However, I believe that also after these examination it is worth a try to use Latour as a philosophical fundament for a theory on spatial change.