4. Changing space in a non-modern Constitution

In the following chapter the non-modern Constitution , as already mentioned at the end of chapter two, will be introduced. In paragraph 4.1 I will explain why I have chosen to use the philosophy of Bruno Latour to confront with the research on spatial change. In the latter paragraphs of this chapter I will introduce his non-modern Constitution. Latour’s project is like cleaning up a room by first putting everything outside, and than refurnish the room from the beginning. In paragraph 4.2 I will show how Latour cleans the room. We are getting rid of all possible prejudice and metaphysics. After doing so we have to refurnish the room from the beginning. In paragraph 4.3 I will start with the floor, curtains and wallpaper. The three divisions, which form the basics of the new Constitution, will be discussed here. In this thesis I will not already put chairs and tables in de room. However I will discuss the Latourian equivalent of the process on how to decide whether some chairs should enter the room or not, and if so where they are going to stand. This equivalent is the process of examining the existence and influence of actors in the new Constitution. Paragraph 4.6 is about planning theorists refurnishing their room: the usability of the non-modern Constitution for planners will be examined here.

4.1 The usability of Latour in planning

Critical theory, which is inspired on Marxism, is still the fundament of most planning theories. There is however (a beginning of) a debate between the representatives of planning theory based on Habermas and the planning theory based on Foucault (Peters 2004:10). As argued in chapter three I believe that we should search for a synthesis of theoretical directions in planning theory. In chapter two I already showed Latour being a synthesis of pre-modernism, modernism and postmodernism on a philosophical level. I now propose to find out whether it is useful to look at Latour’s synthesis and its implications for research on spatial change.

With his new Constitution, Latour adds an important aspect to the present discussion presented by Peters (2004): the mutual influence of humans and non-humans on each other. Latour tears down the wall between nature and culture. He believes this wall does not really exist, but is only a theoretical concept of the old Constitution.

In the new Constitution it is not critical theory that functions as the norm, practice should meet. In the new Constitution reality is sought without any prejudice that distinguishes humans and non-humans before the process of constructing reality has begun. It is for this reason I believe Latour has the potential to enrich contemporary theory of spatial change.

4.2 Getting rid of metaphysics

Up until now I have been talking about the impossible separation between nature and culture more than once. It is now time to find a solution for this problem. An alternative to the separation has to be designed. There are two important difficulties when we want to construct a new Constitution (Latour 2004:57-62).

In the first place it is impossible just to tear down the wall between nature and culture. Nature and culture are designed by the moderns as counterparts. However in the old Constitution nature and society cannot do without each other. Nature can only be about things, facts and non-humans when culture is about subjects, opinions and humans. Bringing nature and culture together will lead to a crisis in knowledge about facts, politics and human morality (Latour 2004:57). In other words: we can not make one out of the two worlds if we do not look at the whole metaphysics of nature, and the (by moderns) perceived differences between nature and culture, objects and subjects, science and politics.

Replacing nature and culture for something new can solve the above-sketched problem. We have to get rid of the two worlds that have prejudice about the influence humans and non-humans can have on each other. Latour suggests using the word collective. In the collective humans and non-humans live together. Nothing is established before anything is collected. The term collective should refer to the work of collecting associations of humans and non-humans.

A second problem in establishing the collective is the problem of speech. If we want to give humans and non-humans the same start position we cannot stick to the one-man-one-vote principle we used to use in Greek direct democracy. This is of course because it is obvious that things cannot speak for themselves like human beings can.

To solve this problem, we have to get rid of nature’s metaphysics in order to design new rules to play the game of constructing reality. We should however not build a new kind of metaphysics. That would mean we would create new prejudices, where we wanted to get rid of prejudices on how humans and non-humans behave. Therefore we cannot make things speak. We can however change the subject-object opposition for the above already mentioned pairing of humans and non-humans. This pairing makes it possible to fill the collective with beings "endowed with will, freedom, speech and real existence" (Latour 2004:61). Doing so would mean that we do not speak any longer about speaking humans and non-speaking non-humans, but about hybrids/propositions that have will, freedom, speech and do exist for real. In the next paragraph we will address the problems we face when we take this notion of hybrids/propositions.

4.3 Three divisions in the world without metaphysics

In the last paragraph we have seen that it is not possible to just put nature and culture together. The only way to break down the separation between the two is to get rid of all prejudice and metaphysics. In this paragraph I will show how Latour wants to build up the new Constitution, without creating a new metaphysics. The composition of the world is not longer a given from the beginning (Latour 2004:62). The composition has to be object of a debate. If we want to be democratic to humans and non-humans, which Latour seems to believe as something that does not need to be discussed, than humans and non-humans should have the same chances. Therefore we need three divisions.

First division: Learning to be circumspect with spokespersons

In the last paragraph I showed that Latour, based on empirical studies, believes in speaking beings who form the collective. I also concluded that things cannot speak for themselves, whereas humans can. In the new Constitution we have to find a modus between these two opposites. Latour (2004:64) offers us the spokesperson. A spokesperson can speak on behalf of humans and non-humans. Latour (2004:67) believes that if no one would say the things speak for themselves, no one would say either that scientists speak on their own about mute things. In other words: what scientists tell us about their research topics does depend on how the non-humans act in the research (see also Latour 1987). In this way we can offer speech to both human and non-human actors in the new Constitution. Someone who says "France has decided ..." can now be treated in the same way as someone who says "Molecule X has an ... effect on ...." An important remark on this indirect democracy is that there is always uncertainty. When we listen to a spokesperson we should always ask ourselves how well the spokesperson has brought the message of the humans and non-humans he is speaking for. However, and this is an important remark, that is not like checking whether the spokesperson sticks to the essence of the proposition he or she is pleading for. In the new Constitution propositions do not have an essence from the beginning. The (serious but not definitive) doubt about the spokesperson is the beginning that could lead to a discussion on the essence of a proposition. Through this discussion the essence of a proposition is assembled step by step (Latour 2004:65).

Second division: Associations of humans and non-humans

In the old Constitution we had to deal with the opposition of objects and subjects. In the new Constitution this opposition is not present anymore. Both humans and non-humans can be an actor in the new Constitution. An actor is defined by Latour (2004:75) as follows: an actor modifies other actors through a series of trials that can be listed thanks to some experimental protocol. As long as the process for becoming an actor is not fulfilled, actors are called propositions. Propositions are associations of humans and non-humans when they are still candidate for becoming an actor in the Constitution.

Third division between humans and non-humans: reality and recalcitrance

Instead of creating another metaphysics, Latour (2004:77) "would like to reopen the public discussion." Reality is to be constructed by this discussion, not before. The collective does not exists out of nature and society, but it is a melting pot of associations of humans and non-humans (Latour 2004:80). These associations are to be discussed. Latour (2004:81) believes the notion of recalcitrance offers the best approach to define non-human actions. As he puts it, like humans the non-humans do not always follow causal laws. Both humans and non-humans are recalcitrant, and therefore we always deal with uncertainty. Uncertainty about how the associations of humans and non-humans will act.

Conclusions

With the three divisions Latour has brought the non-humans into democracy. The non-humans can now, like humans, be a part of democracy. Non-humans are not alone anymore. They are always associated with humans within a proposition. Development plans for the inner city never come without the humans who initiated them. Furthermore, the certainty of facts has been replaced by the uncertainty of recalcitrant associations of human and non-humans.

4.4 The process from propositions to actors

Till now we have been busy with breaking down the metaphysics of the modern Constitution. In the last paragraph I have pointed out how Latour shows us that the modern contradistinction of subject and object was not empirically stated, but just a metaphysical prejudice about how to look at reality. Latour (1987; 1996) has shown in earlier books that in fact there is no subject - object opposition at all. As Latour believes, we always have to deal with associations of humans and non-humans. These associations are called propositions.

Latour leaves open how the propositions form reality together. However he does say a word on the process propositions have to follow through to become real actors in the collective. Latour’s project emphasis a process in which every proposition has the same chances to be considered as an important influence on reality at the end of the process. Latour’s duty is now to design the basic conditions this process should meet. And it is also necessary to say something about the consequences of having no metaphysics on nature anymore.

To avoid premature conclusions about the actions of propositions in reality, we have to find a new separation of the powers. First we have to find out what propositions do play a role altogether. We have to watch carefully if we do not oversee propositions we expect to be unimportant. After finding out how many propositions are part of the collective, the spokespersons can establish the collective. After establishing the collective, we should not throw propositions out of the collective again. Latour (2004:102) designs two powers for this new separation. The first power is about which propositions are going to be a part of the collective (power to take into account). After the first power has done its work the second power comes into play: the power to rank in order. This power is about finding out whether the propositions can live together in the first place, how they influence each other and how important they are in the collective.

In the old Constitution the notion of fact captured two requirements. In the first place scientists should not underestimate the number of facts (perplexity), and they should recognize that facts, once instituted, could not be debated anymore (institution). On the other hand in the notion of values were captured another two requirements. Politicians and moralists should hear out every subject (consultation) and everyone should get their legitimated rank (hierarchization). Latour wants to keep these requirements. He believes the four requirements are to be taken into account to make sense of the world we live in. In the black boxes of fact and value these requirements are locked up (see also Latour 1987). However, to be useful in the new Constitution these requirements should be reordered. As sketched above the first question to answer is the question about how many propositions there are in the collective. Both perplexity and consultation are needed here. We should not simplificate the number of propositions. And we should also recognize that every proposition should be consulted. Propositions have the right to get an honest process.

Figure 4.1 The process through which propositions become actors.

After defining with how many propositions we are, we can rank the propositions in order. Here we need the requirements of institution and hierarchization. We should try to give as much propositions as possible a place somewhere in the collective. For that we need first to hierarchize the propositions. During this step it can be needed to alter the proposition a little bit. The last step to take is the decision whether the proposition can be instituted in the collective, or that it has to be rejected and left outside. In figure 4.1 the powers and their requirements are listed.

In practice it could work like this. When the proposition Renewal of the inner city knocks at the door of the collective it is not real yet. Scientists may have found out that the renewal would be necessary for reasons of increasing traffic in the coming years. Moralists may have called politicians to look at the bad housing situations in the inner city. At this time the proposition has only gained some attention (perplexity). It is not real yet. Before the proposition Renewal of the inner city can get real it should run through the different stages of the powers to take into account and to rank in order. During this process the proposition can make it from idea to a vision on paper to a development plan, to a renewed inner city. During the phase of consultation scientists will do research on the housing facilities, the capacity of roads, the possibilities for renewal of certain buildings and such. Economists can show how the variable of the state of the inner city does affect the happiness of the people living there. Politicians will make a contribution to the process of consulting by making clear how (groups of) citizens think about it. During the consultation, everyone and everything that has a relation with the renewal has to be consulted.

When it comes to hierarchizing different propositions the economists can show how much influence a renewal of the inner city would have on peoples happiness in comparison with other variables. Politicians have to debate pro and contras at this stage. Science makes its contribution by searching for solutions which for example makes it possible that it’s not needed to demolish houses in order to raise the capacity of the roads. In the third stage of the process, everyone is busy to find out whether the propositions can live together in the collective. During this stage the essence of propositions is discussed. During the phase of consultation everyone has different interpretations about the propositions. In the phase of hierarchizing these interpretations are discussed. The outcome of this discussion becomes the essence of the proposition ones it is instituted. A proposition can only be instituted when it was made visible by perplexity, was consulted well enough to make its point clear and was found to be able to live in the collective with other propositions.

There is not really an end of the process of examining propositions by the two powers. After the powers have done their work, we can only scenarizate the collective. A scenarization of the collective has to be seen as a temporally description of how the collective could look. It designates the border between what is in and what is left out (Latour 2004:248-249). A final judgement about reality is not possible. There can always be a second (and a third, fourth etc. etc.) round of discussion. This means that the collective at t=1 can look different at t=2. Everyone who is familiar with the work of Thomas Kuhn (1970) might recognise this argument. Although Latour does not mention the word paradigm at this point, I believe we can see the outcome of a going through the powers as a paradigm. As Kuhn (1970:66-76) states, a paradigm stays real as long as perceived problems can be solved with it. When we meet problems, which the present paradigm cannot solve, we are finding ourselves in a crisis. In practice thus a second round of discussion will only take place if there is a crisis in which revolutionary science, or other words: a complete new road to scenarization is used.

Latour does add two remarks to his theory, which I do not want to explore too much at this point. In the first place, we (the spokespersons) have to be aware of propositions that are left out of the collective. These propositions can be experienced by the notion of uncertainty in processes. This is actually very logic: we do not know what a proposition, we left out of the collective and therefore we did not rank in order, can do to us. We have to take this uncertainty into account. As Latour calls it: we have to be diplomatic in the conversation with propositions outside the collective. We should never underestimate them.

In the second place the collective includes a power to follow through. When we know more and more about reality, we have to archive this knowledge. This is because we do not want to start from the beginning every new day. Latour (2004:202) believes this is a task for administrators. However, the other disciplines do also contribute to the power to follow through. This power makes it possible to learn from what happened before.

We have now completed the transformation from the old Constitution to the new Constitution. The differences are presented in scheme 4.2.

Scheme 4.2: The old and the new Constitution.

4.5 Skills for searching a common world

In the last paragraph I sketched the process in which propositions become actors. We are now ready to look at Latour’s proposal on how to fill in this process. In practice this does mean that we have to look at the same reality as the moderns did, but in a different way. In the modern view scientists were only busy with nature, politicians with the social world, moralists with foundations and economists with infrastructures (Latour 2004:137). In the non-modern Constitution they work together on every stage of the process. We already saw some examples of this in the last paragraph. In this way, politicians, scientists, moralists and economists work together towards an experimental metaphysics. One could argue this division of labour is a bit arbitrary. Scientists, politicians, moralists and economists did only exist in the old Constitution because of the existence of the separate domains on nature and culture. However in the new Constitution, starting with scientists, politicians, moralists and economists should be seen as good sense (Latour 2004:113). The terms should not refer to the precise professions: the social field is not reserved to politicians alone anymore in the new Constitution. It is even worse for the modernism-loving politicians: the social field itself does not exist anymore. As Latour (2004:148) puts it: “there is indeed a division of labour, but there is not a division of the collective.” This division of labour should not be taken as something that cannot be changed. Latour is only sketching the present situation. It cannot be neglected that scientist and politician are two different jobs at the moment. However, when the new Constitution would find a place in our minds, scientists will act more and more like politicians and vice-versa.

Scientists

In the new Constitution the sciences do not produce nature anymore. However they still seem to continue their job. As I interpret Latour, he does not propose to radically change the way scientists do their job. However, from empirical research (e.g. Latour 1987) he derives other conclusions about how to interpret the sciences. As Latour shows us, scientists make a contribution to every stage of the process described in paragraph 4.4. With their instruments in the laboratory they are able to detect new propositions (Latour 2004:137). In this way they make their contribution to perplexity. New phenomena in spatial planning are for example the shrinking cities in Eastern Germany. Demographic research is one of the means by which this can be made visible.

Scientists do also contribute to consultation by creating different tests and experiments. When scientists try to find out by which means the problems of the shrinking city have to be met, there will be very different types of research with probably different outcomes.

Every scientific fact or scientific invention has its own scientific spokesperson. In the way scientists show propositions as being part of a broader network, they make their contribution to the hierarchization of propositions. Science can change the possibilities for propositions to work together. With a technological innovation two propositions who could not live together before, can now. For example, bus stations can be much smaller since computer technology allows optimal use of space by showing the empty platforms to the drivers before they enter the station. After this technological innovation it is much simpler to create bus stations in inner cities.

Institution by scientist is obvious: scientists have to work very hard to make their findings reality. Scientists know better than anyone else how to make irreversible what has been contested for a long time, but has now transmitted itself into a compromise (Latour 2004:139-140; see also Latour 1987). When a planner would find out that people act differently in parks with and without flowers, he or she has to do experiments and a lot of extra research and publishing before it becomes a standard part of every Introduction to city park planning.

Scientists make a contribution to both powers in the new Constitution (Latour 2004:140). However, they also contribute to the separation of the powers. One the one hand scientists claim their autonomy of being able to do research. On the other hand they also recognize established empirical results. Scientists scenerizate by imagining the total common world through theories. This cannot be seen anymore as establishing metaphysics of nature. In the new Constitution it is only a contribution to the experimental metaphysics of the whole Constitution.

Politicians

Politicians are always afraid of excluded voices who strike back. Therefore politicians defend these voices and present them to the collective. This is the input of politicians to perplexity (Latour 2004:144). Because politicians believe they always have to take into account the people that cannot afford a private car, there are always politicians who ask our attention for public transport.

To consultation their contribution is obvious. Producing voices like opinion-holders and concerned parties was already politicians’ core business during modernism. And it still is a big contribution in the new Constitution. Without the voices produced by politicians consultation would be very difficult. Especially plans on city renewal are always discussed by politicians and citizens in local papers, on debate evenings and of course during the municipality Council meeting.

Like the others, politicians also supply their input to hierarchization. By making deals and compromises, everyone, what means every proposition, gets its position. When different groups of politicians have different wishes for the renewal of the inner city they have to make a compromise in order to be able to renew the inner city at all.

The politician contribution to institution is the production of an inside and an outside of the collective. Politicians make enemies by leaving them outside. They have to do so in order to get it on, to make decisions. For example the national government of Belgium could decide not to take part in constructing the High Speed Railway track between Paris and Amsterdam. By acting so, they make a contribution to the power of rank in order. More specific: such decisions are acts of externalization.

With Montesquieu, politicians themselves established the separation of powers. In the new Constitution politicians will defend the distinction between deliberations and decisions. Everybody and everything can be discussed. However, on a certain moment there has to be made a decision which excludes some propositions and includes others. Politicians contribute to the experimental part of Experimental Metaphysics by recognizing that it is not an unchangeable world we live in. On the contrary, politicians believe that they can only bring a provisional unity (Latour 2004:147). The search for this provisional unity makes a fresh start every single day. A new planned railway that is part of today’s Constitution can have disappeared by tomorrow.

Economists

With the term economists, Latour (2004:150) points at those who economize, the ‘economic performers.’ With their scale models of the common world in economic calculations economists contribute to the new Constitution. In the first place, economists are keen on the existence of relations between humans and non-humans. They have to search for propositions that are not already in the economic calculation, but could have a significant influence on the outcome. The width of a roadway might have significant influence on the number of cars passing by on that roadway every day. However, if this variable is not in the calculation it is up to economists to search for the missing proposition.

Economists do always play a role when it comes to consultation of propositions. The importance of certain propositions in the calculation will be examined through an articulation of interests by consumers, exploiters, experts, amateurs and others (Latour 2004:153). An example of this kind of research is the Woningbehoefte onderzoek (housing monitor) that is done every four year by the Dutch government.

When the variables are put into a calculation they have to be given a common language, so that they are commensurable. In the way economists weight the variables, they establish a hierarchy. This is their contribution to this requirement of the power to rank in order. An urban issue, economists could contribute to in this way, is the already mentioned example of cars passing by on a specific roadway. The number of cars passing by might be less depending on the number of houses near this roadway than it does on the number of nearby offices.

By getting reasonable outcomes of calculations, economists contribute to the requirement of institution. By leaving propositions out of the calculation they create an inside and an outside of the collective. When economists decide not to take the variable of travel time (expressed in money savings by travellers) into account, while calculating the profits of a new railway this can have significant influence on the question whether it will be build or not.

To separate the powers, economists make a distinction between the calculations inside of computers on the one hand, and what is really happening in the heads of people and what is the power of the considered goods (Latour 2004:151). The above-described models itself are economists input to the scenarization of the whole: by describing the reciprocal relations between associations of humans and non-humans.

Moralists

In the new Constitution moralist are not only allowed to talk about values, but about all humans and non-humans. They have the right to add scruples to the work of scientists, politicians and economists to make it necessary for them to look for new propositions. This is their contribution to perplexity. When moralists ask attentions for the conditions in which animals have to live at farms, this can make it necessary for scientists, politicians and economists to change their view on how to cope with farms.

Moralists are also calling for the right of propositions to tell their story in their own terms. Farmers demonstrating against European cuts to their subsidies should, as moralists would suggest, not be asked what they think about global sugar production. On the opposite, they should have the possibility to explain their own situation. However, moralists always tend to support the underdog. When the European subsidies to farmers where to be raised, moralists would probably call for listening to third world farmers.

When it comes to hierarchy in the Constitution, moralists bring into debate that every proposition has the right to get its own position. There can only be one best Constitution. Moralists are the ones who remind scientists, politicians and economists to this. To the work of institution, moralists also add a bit of uncertainty. Whereas politicians and economists create an inside and an outside, moralists make clear that the excluded properties should have a second chance.

Whereas politicians see the need for decision-making after deliberation, moralists do turn this view the other way around. In the view of moralists every propositions has the right to be in the collective. Therefore they always call to cross the border between the decision-making of the power to rank in order and the deliberation of the power to take into account. After decision-making, the excluded propositions should not be forgotten, but get the possibility to be included again. Moralists make it also more difficult to scenarizate the whole. They break down the totalitarian visions of the common world, because there are always propositions that have been unlawfully excluded.

4.6 What can planners do?

Now that we know how the non-modern Constitution looks like, we have to ask ourselves what planners can do within this non-modern Constitution. As we can derive from Latour, we cannot see planning anymore as a scientific way of solving spatial problems, like we used to believe in the 1970s. We also cannot see planning anymore as deliberative processes, which outcomes are always feasible, which is in essence Habermas' belief. In other words: spatial change is neither about facts nor it is about subjects. Spatial change is about propositions. The only way to develop theories on spatial planning is to first develop theories on spatial change. When we know how changes in the spatial environment became reality, we can learn something about whether it is possible to plan these changes, and if so, how to plan these changes.

Requirements for spatial change research

We now have to address the question on the need for research on spatial change to meet the requirements set by Latour. I believe, in spatial issues we have to meet the same requirements as in other dimensions of the common world. We have to answer the question which propositions we have to take into account. Without the requirements of perplexity and consultation, we would not know where we are talking about. Than, we could not even answer the question how the propositions, which influences spatial changes, look like. When we want to be sure that we take every possible propositions into account, we have no other choice than to take the requirements of perplexity and consultation into account.

When we want to know more about spatial changes, and want to rank the propositions in this field in order, we have to meet the Latourian requirements of hierarchy and institution. As we saw earlier, the process of rank in order as described by Latour can also be used to explicate spatial issues. How much influence have technological findings on politicians? And: how much influence has a company, which is paying for the research, on these findings? These questions are also important when we want to find out more about the question how did spatial changes become reality? Therefore, in spatial change research, it is necessary to meet these requirements.

Experimental metaphysics on spatial change and planning

This section will be about how to create a scenarization on spatial changes. As argued above this is the first thing we have to do when we want to know more about how changes in the spatial environment become reality. The six disciplines indicated by Latour (2004) can work together on spatial issues as well. Or from another point of view: a planner can act simultaneously as a scientist, a politician, an economist, a moralist, an administrator and a diplomat.

We have seen the examples of spatial issues in paragraph 4.5 already. We now have to ask ourselves how we can use the experimental metaphysics in spatial research. Implementing Latour’s theory into the field of spatial science would mean that we have several things to do.

In the first place planning theorists have to recognize that it are not only the people we have called planners ever since who are contributing to spatial changes. Every scientist, politician, economist and moralist approaching spatial issues is contributing to the experimental metaphysics on spatial change. In this way the search for the 'right' definition of planner is not that useful. How the four above-mentioned disciplines provide their input to the experimental metaphysics was already sketched in the last paragraph in the form of some examples. In the next chapter this will be examined more deeply.

In the second place planning theorists have to be ready for another type of theory. In the old Constitution there is made a differentiation between 'objective' empirical/descriptive theory and 'subjective' prescriptive theory (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995). For planners in the old Constitution it was not enough to have an empirical theory on spatial change. Planners also needed prescriptive theory. A prescriptive theory is a theory concerned with best means of achieving a specific condition (Judge, Stoker and Wolman 1995:2). Such theories can also tell us something about the spatial conditions planning can provoke at all. Prescriptive theory is to be derived from empirical (descriptive) theory. However, at this point we face the problem that empirical theory in the old Constitution is largely metaphysical and that prescriptive theory has a normative component in it. Latour does not recognize the opposition of fact and opinion. Therefore empirical and prescriptive theory cannot exist in the new Constitution. A solution to this problem is presented by Hans Harbers (2005): theories like the new Constitution are rescriptive. Latour has developed a sociological theory that tries to reconstruct what has happened in the Constitution. This is neither factual nor normative (Harbers 2005). Developing a rescriptive theory is also a task for the collective as a whole. Again it are scientists, politicians, economists and moralists working on it together. Rescriptive theory develops during the process of propositions running through the powers of taking into account and ranking into order. Again, it the task of the administrators to make sure everything is being put on paper so that we do not forget the final result of our deliberations, experiments and model making. Rescriptive theory can be used by planners as an alternative to empirical and prescriptive theory. It is the task of planning theorists to write down this rescriptive theory. Planning theorists are the administrators of spatial change. In opposition to Latour I do not believe that administrators can be absolutely independent from the scientists, politicians, economists and moralists. Planners who read about a certain theory may try harder to put practice in the direction that fits into the theory. This is what the Dutch government tries to do with communicative planning theory. New spatial policies like the Nota Ruimte (National Spatial Strategy) try to meet the requirements of a communicative planning process.

Furthermore planning theorists and planners have to stop being afraid of uncertainty. We should not longer try to rule out uncertainty. As Latour states, uncertainty is something that cannot be ruled out at all. Therefore we should take uncertainty into account. That would mean that we have to act like a diplomat. The spokespersons of the new Constitution need the diplomat to stay in touch with the uncertain outside of the collective (Latour 2004:213-214). When we accept a certain level of uncertainty we can also start to make experimental plans in order to try out new ways of changing the spatial environment.

Conclusions

From the above paragraph, we can derive the conclusion that the new Constitution can be used for spatial issues. As we saw earlier in this chapter, following the exact procedure and meeting the same requirements could lead us to a scenarization of spatial changes. Now we can see how spatial changes became common knowledge. The scenarization also makes it visible what influence planners have at these changes.