2. Modernism, postmodernism, synthesis

In this chapter I want to introduce modernist philosophy since Kant and Marx, the philosophical crises in the 1970s and the reactions on this crisis in the 1980s in Germany, France and Anglo-America. In the last paragraph the philosophy of Bruno Latour will be introduced. I will suggest that Latour could be the philosophical synthesis, which we can also use in spatial change theory.

2.1 Modernism and its crisis

It's not easy to put a date on the beginning of philosophical modernism. The modernism, which technical rational planning theory was based on, can be seen as a process that started with the Enlightenment. In this thesis the work of Immanuel Kant will be seen as the beginning of modernism. As Kant (1784) puts it, Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. When people start to reason in public and can openly express criticism on the state of the world there can be reached progress towards a world in which people are not only immature machines, but free men who are treated in a way human should be treated (Kant 1784). Another philosopher whose work can be seen as the beginning of modernism is Karl Marx. He emphasized a more pro-active philosophical approach. In his Thesis on Feuerbach Marx concluded that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." (Marx 1845).

After World War II the German philosopher Adorno begins to criticise, what he called, the misunderstood rationality in the Enlightenment. According to Adorno the rationality of the Enlightenment had been reduced to goal-means rationality (Doorman & Pott 2002:83). Therefore it became possible that the Nazi’s used the rationality of the Enlightenment to kill millions in a technical rational process.

Adorno was one of the first philosophers who have criticised the Enlightenment from within the tradition. He tries to demystify the definition of Enlightenment rationality (Doorman & Pott 2002:83). Adorno believes that rationality becomes a myth when we forget that the identification by defining the world leads to a situation in which the original (not identical) is reduced to what it is in a general sense (Doorman & Pott 2002:84). In other words: the particular is not paid attention to. The general is all what counts. Adorno emphasizes identificational thinking that takes this unavoidable reduction into account. Although Adorno's philosophy became very popular in the 1960s and 1970s this popularity did not last (Doorman & Pott 2002:77). However, criticism on modernity did not disappear. In Germany, France and Anglo-America different philosophers have criticised modernism in different ways. According to Rajchman (1991:4), Michel Foucault in France, Jürgen Habermas in Germany and Richard Rorty in America have criticized modernistic philosophy. Because of the fact that the debate is now about philosophy itself, we can say that there is a crisis in philosophical thinking. In the late 1970s and the 1980s of the last century philosophers from all over the world had at least one thing in common. After they had begun reading each others work more and more they came to the conclusion that the philosophical backgrounds in Germany, France and the United States were incompatible with each other. The different philosophical directions came to confront each other (Rajchman 1991:4). The crisis in philosophy was born.

2.2 Opposite thinking: Habermas and Foucault

Many different philosophers have found different approaches meet the critics on modernity. In this paragraph Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault will be introduced. I will argue that Habermas and Foucault can be seen as opposite thinkers. Habermas wants to save the project of modernity, whereas Foucault's work has more postmodern characteristics.

2.2.1 Habermas' theory of communicative action

First I discuss Habermas' theory of communicative action. Habermas' work became important for planning when planning theorists in Great Britain began to use his theory of communicative action to develop a communicative approach for planning.

According to Habermas, the crisis in philosophy does not mean that modernism should come to an end, although he admits the existence of this crisis. Habermas believes that the project called modernism is unfinished. Modernism should however learn from its own faults (Habermas 1980).

Habermas (1980) follows Max Weber when he says that the Enlightenment has led to a differentiation of the cultural modernism between science, morality and art. Postmodern philosophy wants to break through this differentiation (Habermas 1980). Habermas believes we should stick to the differentiation between the three cultural value spheres. By learning from failures, the project of the Enlightenment can be saved, Habermas believes. Communication is essential here because of the relation between rationality and communication (Habermas 1987:16). To make it possible to deal with rationality, Habermas has set up his theory of communicative action.

Habermas is often described as the most important representative of the second generation of critical theory. In emulation of Adorno and Weber, Habermas believes there are different types of rationality. He differentiates between cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality (Habermas 1987:28). With the introduction of communicative rationality Habermas is going further than Adorno, as the latter only differentiated between two forms of cognitive-instrumental rationality.

At the beginning of his book, Habermas (1987:28) defines communicative rationality as zwanglos (free) communication that is focussing on achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims. Further on he defines the term more precisely (Habermas 1987:114). In this definition communicative rationality is: firstly, the processes by which different validity claims are brought to a satisfactory solution. Secondly, it is about the relations people have to the world when they choose to use the validity claims for their expressions.

Until now I have only spoken about communicative rationality. Habermas (1987) however develops a theory of communicative action. Habermas calls actions communicative when the actors base their actions on Akte der verständigung (acts of reaching understanding) (Habermas 1987:385). The actors should only try to reach their own goals when it fits into the Situationsdefinition (situation definition), which is accepted by all participating actors. In that sense the debate on how to formulate a common Situationsdefinition is an important part of communicative action. Communicative actions can be distinguished from instrumental actions and strategic actions (Habermas 1987:384)

Habermas believes that when we act in a communicative way, it is impossible not to take into account three specific criteria. Actors who are acting in a communicative way do always take these into account. In the first place this is about truth. Statements should be true (Habermas 1987:149). In the second place statements should be 'right' in relation to the normative context in which they are used. This is called the validity claim of legitimacy. In the last place, statements should be meant in the way there expressed (truthfulness or sincerity). Forester (1989:144) has used a variant of these criteria from earlier work of Habermas to set up heuristic questions for planning (see also paragraph 3.3). When people take the criteria into account, an ideal speech situation would emerge. It would mean that power-relations do not influence the result of the deliberations. However, this is only the case when people act in a communicative way rather that in an instrumental or strategic way.

The theory of communicative action was set up by Habermas (1987a:583) to clear up the normative foundation of a critical theory of society. This may sound a bit paradoxical. Criticizers of Habermas have said this is like trying to make truth of something that is normative. Habermas however sticks to his conclusion that we should leave the technical rationalism in favour of his theory of communicative action to save the project of modernity (Rajchman 1991:9). Habermas believes that the evil of German fascism has shown that subject-centred reasoning is dangerous. This kind of reasoning could occur when there is an economic crisis in a society which is focusing on goal-means rationality (Habermas 1987a:563-567). It is important to mention this, because it shows that Habermas wants something to change in reality with his theory. It shows that Habermas makes the normative statement that we have to act in a communicative way to avoid the danger of social disintegration and the developing of dictatorial states. Habermas accuses French philosophy of developing such dangerous philosophies. Rajchman (1991:10) concludes that Habermas wants to show the French how they can become liberal rationalists. Habermas tries to save the modernity of Kant by giving humans the possibility to speak in a context that is free of power. In the theory of communicative action humans are treated as ends in themselves. As we can derive from the work of Adorno, it was a big mistake that modernity was reduced to goal-means rationality. With his theory of communicative action, Habermas has tried to save the original definition of enlightenment by Kant.

2.2.2 Foucault's archaeology of knowledge

Michel Foucault was one of the philosophers who are continuously in debate with Jürgen Habermas. The work of Foucault has already been used by urban planners like Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson (Peters 2004:10). Planning theorists have focused on Foucault's analysis of power. However Foucault developed a philosophy on more than power relations alone. It is also about the archaeology of knowledge and about relations of the self to the self. In this thesis, the archaeology of knowledge and relations of power are the most important part of Foucault's work. Therefore I will only address this part of his philosophy.

Foucault's philosophy is about different-thinking (Doorman & Pott 2002:221). Foucault likes to break with common beliefs, and turn everything around. This way of thinking is also of big importance in his archaeology of knowledge. Foucault argues that there is no reason to believe that there is only one kind of rationality. As Doorman & Pott (2002:223) are sketching, Foucault takes scientific knowledge as an historical construction. Every kind of common knowledge can be disrupted and be substituted for another common knowledge. An example of such an event is sketched by Nietzsche (1882) in his Fröhliche Wissenschaft. Nietzsche describes a fool who is looking for God with a lantern of a sun shining day on the market. As the man cannot find God, he claims God was killed by people. This could be the breakpoint of two periods of common knowledge in history. One with an alive and kicking God, one where He is dead.

Archaeology of knowledge shows us the different layers of common knowledge through history. The archaeology of knowledge reconstructs the structure of every layer and indicates the differences between the layers of knowledge. By showing these differences, the archaeology of knowledge cannot do otherwise than criticise today's common knowledge (Doorman & Pott 2002:224). While layering historical periods of different common knowledge, archaeology of knowledge has to break up our today's common knowledge. At this point, our legitimations of today's common knowledge will often be discovered as incorrect. Foucault believes that truth and the rational human are not the source of common knowledge but, on the opposite, that humans are products of systems of common knowledge. This is the different-thinking Foucault is practicing.

Foucault is no absolute relativist (Kelly 1994:390). He does not believe that there is nothing we can philosophize about. He recognises the importance of truth. However, Foucault does not believe that there is only one truth. This pluralism makes it harder, but also more necessary to stick to truth (Doorman & Pott 2002:225). Truth depends not on something outside the system (e.g. God, metaphysics), but on the relations in the system itself. It is at this point, that Foucault introduces his power analysis.

Relations of power determine humans. Humans are produced by power relations (Doorman & Pott 2002:228). Discipline makes individuals, as Foucault shows in his book Discipline and punish (1977:170). Disciplination and normalisation are present mechanisms of power. These mechanisms form not only prisoners and criminals, but also the brave citizens we all want to be (Doorman & Pott 2002:229).

As I mentioned already, Foucault is not a relativist. However, he has been accused of degrading humans to aboulic casualties of systems of power (Doorman & Pott 2002:230). This art of criticism plays an important role in the work of Jürgen Habermas. Foucault has rejected this criticism. He believes (power-)systems are not stable, but sensitive to resistance. Power and the resistance to it, can lead to other structures of power. According to Foucault, every system of power will lead to resistance by the people who have less power. The big difference between Foucault and Habermas is that Foucault does not believe power can be knocked down in the end. Power relations will always determine humans. Resistance to power can only change power, but it cannot make power disappear (Doorman & Pott 2002:231). This is what makes Foucault postmodern. He rejects rationality and puts power in its place.

2.3 Synthesis: Rorty and Latour

In the last paragraph, modernism has been saved by Jürgen Habermas (at least he tried to) and postmodernism has emerged from the work of Michel Foucault. Modernism and postmodernism can be seen as opposite forms of philosophy. Until now the debate between the two forms of philosophy is still ongoing. However, there are also philosophies who try to reach a synthesis.

When we use the notion of synthesis, we are facing a thesis called modernism and an anti-thesis called postmodernism. Using this notion, I will be able to find a philosophy that synthesizes the best of different theories in it. A synthesis is more than just a compromise. I will borrow Hegel's definition of synthesis as a guide leading us to a philosophy that has the potential to make us understand spatial change. A synthesis arises when the two extremes are aufgehoben. Hegel uses the word aufgehoben in three different ways. A thesis and an anti-thesis are aufgehoben when they are preserved, abrogated and brought to a higher level (Doorman & Pott 2002:81).

The work of Richard Rorty and Bruno Latour can be seen as attempts to reach a syntheses based on modernism and postmodernism. Richard Rorty is characterised by Rajchman (1991:12) as a philosopher who does not need the philosophy of Kant to be a liberal. I believe that also Latour has an innovative view on philosophy that could lead to a synthesis. In his book We have never been modern (1993) Latour tries to find a synthesis between pre-modernism, modernism and postmodernism step by step. The work of both Rorty and Latour is discussed in this paragraph.

Both Rorty and Latour have criticized the synthesis of Hegel. Latour wants to break down all separations, whereas Hegel sets up new separations. According to Latour (1993:57) Hegel is pushing this separation to the top and beyond, and makes it the driving force of history. Rorty (1989:78) sees Hegel’s dialectical method not as an argumentative procedure, but just as a literary skill. Rorty (1989:79) argues that Hegel’s philosophy cannot be an argument in favour of modernism. What Hegel actually did was founding an ironist tradition within philosophy.

I believe that this criticism does not make it impossible to use the philosophy of Hegel to characterize both Rorty and Latour. The reason is simple. In this thesis Hegel will not be used to clarify our whole history. I am only asking permission to use Hegel’s dialectics to characterize philosophical theories. I think even Latour should agree on the belief that there are more or less opposite philosophical theories on how our world looks like. And to satisfy Rorty, I will promise here that I will not use Hegel to give modernism a philosophical fundament.

2.3.1 Rorty: liberalism without rationality

The third approach for finding a solution to solve the crisis in philosophy can be found in the Anglo-American tradition. Richard Rorty is one of the most important representatives of the Anglo-American pragmatism after the philosophical crisis.

According to Rorty (1989:73) we do all have our own final vocabulary. A final vocabulary is a set of words, which we employ to justify our actions, beliefs and lives. A final vocabulary contains the words in which we tell the story of our live. Rorty (1989:XIV) distinguishes intellectuals in ironist like Nietzsche (and Foucault), and metaphysicians like Marx, Habermas and Rawls. Ironists and metaphysicians differ in how they deal with uncertainty about their final vocabulary.

Ironists are people who fulfil three conditions (Rorty 1989:73). First an ironist has fundamental and ongoing doubts about her own final vocabulary, because she has been impressed by final vocabularies of others. Second, she realises that these doubts cannot be solved through argumentation within the borders of her own final vocabulary. Third, an ironist does not believe her own final vocabulary to be more real than others.

Metaphysicians are also having doubts. But they differ from ironists in how they deal with their doubts. Rorty adapts the definition of the term metaphysician from Heidegger. In this definition a metaphysician is someone who takes the question "What is the intrinsic nature of something (e.g. justice, science, knowledge, Being, faith, morality, philosophy)?" at face value (Rorty 1989:74). The metaphysician believes that the terms in his final vocabulary are referring to something with a real essence.

In his analyses of ironists and metaphysicians, Rorty uses a differentiation between the private and the public. On the one hand we have the private sphere as being a place for self-realisation. And, on the other hand, we face the public sphere in which we have to get in touch with other people and live with them on one planet. The public-private split is used by Rorty to make it possible that we all become ironists without facing the cruel consequences of ironic final vocabularies. This is important as Rorty emphasis intellectuals becoming ironists.

It is in his book Contingency, irony and solidarity Rorty tries to show that intellectuals should become liberal ironists. Rorty borrows his definition of liberal from Judith Shklar. In her view liberals are the people who think that cruelty is the worst thing humans do (Rorty 1989:XV). Rorty is, however, not giving a philosophical fundament for his statement. On the contrary: Rorty (1989:5) believes that there cannot be found any philosophical fundamentals for any universal theory. According to Rorty (1989:94-95), philosophy has to stay in the private sphere. Being an ironist, one can philosophize as much as one wants. However, the ironist will never search for universal philosophical fundamentals or such (Rorty 1989:73). In the public sphere philosophy has no function anymore. Here we should endeavour to reach solidarity. Because the need to strive for solidarity cannot be founded on philosophical fundamentals, Rorty has to find something else to state his argument. Rorty (141-144) believes this can be found in literature and art.

Rorty tries to solve the debate between Habermas and Foucault by splitting up the world in a private sphere and a public sphere. In the public sphere we should follow Habermas without the need and possibility to state this with philosophical fundamentals. In the private sphere we can philosophize in the way the French are doing. This is how John Rajchman puts it: Rorty tells us that Foucault's work is only of private importance, and that we should not project his philosophy on the world. On the other hand he agrees on Habermas that there is a need to be liberal. However, Rorty believes that we don't need to search for universal fundamentals to underpin this need (Rajchman 1991:12).

Richard Rorty's philosophical work is seen as a synthesis to the opposite philosophies of Habermas and Foucault. However there can be made some remarks. In the first place it can be questioned whether Rorty is really doing something new, which is an important part of the notion of synthesis I have put forward. The biggest part of both Habermas' and Foucault's work stay the same. It is only put into a framework of public and private worlds. In the second place the fundament for Rorty's theory is not that stable. Rorty argues that the use of philosophical fundaments is not possible and not needed. However, at the same time Rorty uses art and literature as a fundament to underpin the need of solidarity. Rorty does not make clear why the philosophical fundaments become obsolete, whereas at the same time literature and art make it possible to make a social-liberal out of everyone.

2.3.2 Latour: the non-modern alternative

In this chapter we have seen that there have been different approaches on solving the crisis in philosophy over the years. These different approaches are still very much bound to their geographic place. Habermas in Germany thinks that introducing more forms of rationality can save modernism. Foucault in France turns everything around. As he argues, not rationality creates reality but power does. Rorty tries to make a synthesis out of these two clashing philosophers. However, it can be questioned whether he created something new. Furthermore his alternative to the impossibility of using philosophy as a fundament to theorizing is not convincing. A synthesis that may be more useful to explain spatial change can be found in the work of Bruno Latour. He tries to show that pre-modernism, modernism and postmodernism can be aufgehoben in favour of the synthesis called non-modern Constitution.

Latour (1993:56) agrees on the belief that Kant can be seen as the beginning of modernism. However, to show how the modern Constitution is set up he uses the work of Boyle and Hobbes. These two sociologists construct two separations on which the modern Constitution can be recognised (Latour 1993:13). On the one hand we have the separation between humans and non-humans constructed by Boyle. On the other hand we find a separation between the modern Constitution in which humans and non-humans are separated, and the pre-modern culture in which there is not such separation. Here we see hybrid networks of humans and non-humans (see scheme 3.1). We, in the Western world, think that through the separation of humans and non-humans we became the leading part of the world (Latour 1993:97). In what we call pre-modern cultures, which are observed by anthropologists, the hybrids of nature and culture are still visible.

Scheme 2.1*
*to see the schemes, you will have to download the PDF-file.

By linking up humans and non-humans within a network, hybrids are created. Latour (1993:10) calls this the work of translation. Hybrids are defined by Latour as “mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture.” It are associations of humans and non-humans. As we shall see in chapter four, Latour has also called them propositions. An example of a proposition/hybrid is a mound. When we ask people whether a mound is cultural or natural some might answer cultural because of the fact that people created them. Others would name the sea as a natural cause for the existence of mounds. Furthermore they would point to the fact that mounds do exist out of mud. With the notion of proposition/hybrid we can make an end to this never ending discussion. Mounds are neither cultural nor natural. Mounds are none of the two and both of them at the same time. Mounds are hybrids.

The work of translation is separated from the work of purification. Here humans and non-humans are separated. Humans are represented by politicians, non-humans by science. Politics and science should remain separate in the modern Constitution (Latour 1993:28). Habermas does also fit into this view on modernism. As Habermas (1980) believes there are even three different cultural spheres in the modern world. Science, morality and art. Politics finds its place within the sphere of morality.

The modern Constitution offers four guaranties (Latour 1993:32). Firstly: even though we construct Nature, Nature is as if we did not construct it. We do take science as the absolute truth. This is regarded by Latour as the first paradox of modernism. On the one hand we see nature as immanent, whereas on the other hand nature is constructed by scientists. Secondly: even though we do not construct Society, Society is as if we did construct it. In the modern Constitution the effects non-humans have on humans are neglected in the sense that we do not make non-humans part of the political process. On the other hand: the non-humans are recognised as important when we see them as facts we cannot change. However, at the same time we act as if humans and only humans can decide on how society will function. This is the second paradox of the modern constitution. Thirdly: Nature and Society must remain absolutely distinct: the work of purification must remain absolutely distinct from the work of mediation. Fourthly: the crossed-out God is totally absent but ensures arbitration between the two branches of government. God has no influence anymore within the worlds of nature and society. However He ensures the separation of the two. Modern men are atheists and religious at the same time (Latour 1993:32).

The modern Constitution carries a lot of paradoxes in it. As mentioned above Latour believes this Constitution cannot be hold. Habermas attempt to save modernism is criticised strongly by Latour (1993:60). He calls this attempt “one of the most desperate.” He accuses Habermas of abstaining from all empirical inquiry when he wants to save modernism. “Not a single case-study in the five hundred pages of his [theory of communicative action]” concludes Latour expressing his perplexity on this. On the other hand the postmodern alternatives to Habermas cannot satisfy Latour either. He sees postmodernism as a symptom of modernity. Postmodernism is not an alternative to the modern Constitution, but it is only questioning the guaranties of this Constitution (Latour 1993:46).

Rather than choosing site for either Habermas or his postmodern criticisers like Lyotard and Foucault, Latour is developing a non-modern Constitution. In order to get this Constitution Latour makes a list of elements he wants to keep from the pre-moderns, the moderns and the postmoderns (see Latour 1993:135). In essence Latour wants to show that not only humans have influence on society. Also non-humans and hybrids have an influence on this society. In fact, Latour believes that there are no pure subjects and objects at all, but that only hybrids do exist. Latour (1993:144) concludes that it has always been like this, so that we only have to recognise that we have never been modern.